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Débarquement

Détails officiels et témoignage personnels du Raid de Dieppe.

BATTLE SUMMARY No. 33

In an attempt to secure the vital eastern headland, the Military Force Commander, who apparently did not know fully of the critical position ashore, decided to send in his floating reserve the Fusiliers Mont-Royal to Red Beach.

 

With the aid of smoke, and in the face of avery heavy firing, some of them were successfully put ashore at 0704 under the direction of Lt. Cdr J.H. Dathan, R.N., Senior Officer of Group 7, in M.L.214. He took 26 L.C.P., losing two when beached and a third during the withdrawal. So intense was the enemy's fire that the Fusiliers achieved little or no success and suffered serious losses as soon as they landed. Two small parties succeeded in penetrating into the town and dock area, but few returned.

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Meanwhile, owing to failure to allow for the then strong westerly set of the ride and the superabundance of smoke, some 300 officers and men of the Fusiliers had to be landed, not according to plan, but on the very constricted beach below the western headland. No frontal advance was praticable and attempts to move out on their flank proved unsuccessful.

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Around noon 288 of them, of whom some 100 were wounded, surrendered.

The Landing of the Fusiliers

At 0630 hrs, accordingly, the entry was made in the ''Calpe'' Intelligence Log, ''Fus.M.R. going ashore Red beach".

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Lt.-Col. Menard had gone aboard ''Calpe'' at 0610 hrs and had received his instruction. There instruction were now passed to the L.C.P.(L)a by loud hailer, to the following effect. Whereas in the event of everything going according to plan the Fus. M.R. had been instructed to concentrate, after landing, in the PARC JEHAN ANGO, preparatory to establishing an inner perimeter and covering the withdrawal of the main force.

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Lt. A.A. Masson states that the boats, which navel evidence indicates were 26 in number, approached the beach in a single line. He believes, but is not entirely certain, that the order of sub-units from right to left (i.e., from west to east) was ''D'' Coy, ''A'' Coy, ''C'' Coy; H.Q. Group; and ''B'' Coy.

*Missing source*

D Coy, also landed on RED BEACH, about 30 yds due East of A coy, and at the same time. A Coy landed on RED BEACH, opposite the cliff on DIEPPE front. 

Lt. Colin Kitching R.N.V.R   - Full Testimony here -

[...] Back on ML 214 Dathan told us over the loud hailer what we had to do and wished us good luck. The shapeless mass of 26 LCPs quickly formed into two columns in line ahead, with our lot, the 4th Flotilla, in the port column and the 5th Flotilla to starboard. Lieut-Cdrs Wallace and Roulston led the two columns towards the smoke which concealed our landing area, the nature & position of which most of us were unaware, of course, there being no opportunity for a specific briefing.

 

It was by now a brilliantly sunny morning. We were in clear view of the gun batteries on the headlands and they shelled us vigorously as we went ahead in perfect formation. In  [L.C.P.] 192 I had taken over the wheel and throttle, dispelling the vision of A. B. Brown thrusting the boat on to the beach at ten knots. I had despatched him to the bridge with our stripped Lewis gun, which could be fired from the shoulder.

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Half a mile before entering the smoke the signal was given to deploy into line abreast. Wallace's boat turned 90° to port, Roulston's 90° to starboard. As each succeeding boat reached that spot it turned to port or starboard to follow its next ahead. At the moment the last boat in each column made its turn we were, therefore, in one long line, parallel to the smoke-hidden beach but the respective Flotillas were actually steaming away from each other. Instantly the order came for the 4th Flotilla to turn 90? to starboard and the 5th Flotilla to port - and lo and behold, all 26 craft were in perfect line abreast, heading for the beach. It was a manoeuvre we had practised often in the Solent and it took some doing to get it absolutely right even there. But to see it happen impeccably under intense shellfire was an inspiration.

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We were quickly engulfed in the wall of smoke, some of which came from smoke floats and canisters but some from LCTs burning on or just off the central beaches. When we emerged I found that 192 was in clear visibility, about 200 yards from the beach. We then realised, rather disconcertingly, that on this bright, sunny morning, we were about to touchdown in front of Dieppe's central promenade area, and I must admit that in all the manoeuvering up to this point I had concentrated so much on my "driving" duties that I'd forgotten to tell the Fusiliers' Lieutenant to get his men up on deck, ready to land. He it was who, seeing his colleagues appearing in the adjoining LCPs, asked as we entered the smoke - "Should I get my men up?" I hastily agreed, but by the time we were approaching the beach in the clear only about half the platoon were crouching on the deck. In fact, my omission almost certainly saved some casualties on board 192: in other craft the crowd of soldiers on deck now led to casualties as we came under machine gun and mortar fire from the promenade. Many of my passengers came up from below and went more or less straight on to the beach.

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I can say unhesitatingly that the stretch between the smoke and the beach formed the most dangerous 200 yards of space I've ever had to cover. Shells from the headlands were still pitching among us: mortar bombs - presumably with impact detonators - were exploding everywhere but most alarming of all was the machine gun fire from the high buildings at the back of the promenade.

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Facing 192 was a tall yellowish building with black iron balconies. From the top floor somebody was operating a machine gun with tracer in the belt and I had the distinct impression that he was firing at me personally. The general din was so tremendous that I couldn't hear the bullets whizz by: but I could certainly see the tracer and found it disconcerting.

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A great deal seemed to happen in what must really have been quite a short time. We had all reduced speed for the touchdown, but the formation remained perfect. My soldiers were clambering on deck. The Lieutenant crouched in the bow ready to lead his men ashore. On my shouted instructions Brown was firing the Lewis gun, over my head, at the window in the yellowish building from which the tracer was emerging.

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​As I touched down on the pebble beach my faculties were fiercely concentrated on keeping the boat at right angles. We did not want to slip sideways in the tide and broach to: Dathan had reminded us of the need to get off the beach quickly when we had landed the troops so as to be available to pick them up again in due course. The Lieutenant jumped from the bow and led his men up the beach. But in a dozen or so strides over the pebbles he was hit, mortally I believe.

Interview with Lieut. A.A. Masson

The L.C.P.(L)s approached the beach in single line. ''A'' Coy was to Mr. Masson's right and the H.Q. group to his left. He thinks that ''D'' Coy was further to the right, beyond ''A'', and ''B'' to his left; but he is not entirely certain of the order.

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Moving inshore the boats passed through two lines of smoke, but for some distance from the shore there was no smoke whatever, and here they came under heavy and accurate fire, Mr. Masson thinks either from mortars or howitzers. He believes R.23, the boat immediately to his left, hit and sunk, and saw other craft struck. His own craft was not hit, though there were many near misses. Mr. Masson placed one if his Bren guns on either side of the craft, and they fired on the enemy positions on the cliffs before landing.

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On approaching the shore the L.C.P. group moved to the right, i.e. to the westward, Mr. Masson believes on account of the heavy fire from the east cliff. The consequence was that a considerable portion of the unit was landed on the narrow strip of beach under the cliffs west of the Casino.

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